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Preface
I originally became interested in International Humanitarian Law before I ever even
stepped foot outside the U.S. However, as a somewhat naïve college student, I was
generally unaware that IHL consists of more than just mandates to provide humanitarian
assistance to victims of violence. After visiting the ICRC, a new-founded interest began
to take form, and the Law of Armed Conflict clearly became a subject of curiosity. In the
present reality of the “War on Terror,” I increasingly became interested in the ways that
armed conflict has changed since the start of the 21st century, and in what ways parties to
violent conflict find it difficult to abide by International Humanitarian Law. While there
are a multitude of reasons why non-State actors should, but do not comply with
humanitarian norms, I truly believe that it is the obligation of Western, “civilized” States
to take responsibility for their own violations in order to more fully encourage
compliance on behalf of all belligerents. Only if this is achieved—by denouncing
inhumane practices in war such as counter-terrorist strategies that explicitly degrade
human dignity—will the reduction of human suffering in times of armed conflict be
accomplished.
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Abstract
The changing nature of warfare in the 21st century poses a multitude of challenges to the
perceived applicability of International Humanitarian Law for both State and non-State
actors in contemporary conflicts. These issues, including but not limited to: ambiguity in
the distinction of violent conflict, the changing type of actors involved, issues of
asymmetric warfare, challenges of negative reciprocity, and an inhibited ability to engage
with all parties to conflict, are detrimental to the overriding purpose of IHL. Still, the
oftentimes inefficient nature of the international system, as well as lack of consensus
regarding new legislation means that formal changes in IHL to more flexibly reflect the
reality of situations will not be developed anytime in the near future. Therefore, it is in
the best interest of all parties to non-international conflicts to aspire to better respect the
existing norms of IHL, which can only be attained if States recognize the dire need for
inclusive engagement with all types of non-State actors. In addition, practices of positive
reciprocity must be carried out by all parties, in order to better serve the ultimate goal of
International Humanitarian Law: the reduction of human suffering, and the preservation
of human dignity in times of violent armed conflict.

3

Table of Contents
I. Introduction
a) The Existing Framework of IHL

5

b) Changing Perceptions
III. The Evolving Nature of Warfare
a) Emerging Patterns

8

b) The Predominance of Non-International Conflicts
c) The Prevalence of Non-State Actors
IV. Challenges to IHL in the Context of Contemporary Conflicts 17
a) Non-State Actors: Bound Without Consent or Opportunity
For Participation
b) Asymmetric Warfare
1) Combat in the Middle East
c) State Power and the Global “War on Terror”
1) Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project
d) The Reciprocity Obstacle
V. Implications for Compliance with IHL
a) Necessity for Working in the Context of the Existing
Framework

26

b) Taking Steps Towards Promoting Non-State Compliance
VI. Concluding Remarks

32

VII. Bibliography

35

VIII. ISP Work Journal

38

4

I.

Introduction
In 2010, in his report to the United Nations Security Council on the protection of

civilians in armed conflict, the Secretary-General stressed the need for “a comprehensive
approach towards improving compliance with the law” by armed non-State actors, and
stated that:
Improved compliance with international humanitarian law and human rights law
will always remain a distant prospect in the absence of, and absent acceptance of
the need for, systematic and consistent engagement with non-state armed groups.
Whether engagement is sought with armed groups in Afghanistan, Colombia, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the occupied Palestinian territories, Pakistan,
Somalia, the Sudan, Uganda, Yemen or elsewhere, experience shows that lives
can be saved by engaging armed groups in order to seek compliance with
international humanitarian law in their combat operations and general conduct,
gain safe access for humanitarian purposes and dissuade them from using certain
types of weapons.1
Yet in the context of modern warfare of the 21st century, the practice of engaging nonState actors to ensure more comprehensive compliance with International Humanitarian
Law is often thwarted by the distorted perception that IHL cannot, or should not be
applied in all situations of armed combat. But what is the reason for this phenomenon,
and how can it be discontinued and further prevented? What are the real-life challenges to
compliance with IHL in combat, and how can they be overcome?
While the answer to these questions could no doubt fill hundreds of pages, it is the
aim of this paper to outline some of the most foreboding threats to the effective practice
of International Humanitarian Law in the current era, and stress the necessity for
impartial engagement with the fastest growing type of belligerent in armed conflict: the
non-State actor. In a period marked by the phenomenon of globalization, implications for

1

‘Report of the UN Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict’
(UN Security Council, UN doc. S/2010/579, November 2010), 11.
5

the practice and preservation of humanitarian norms are still unclear, and it is the duty of
both States and non-State actors alike, to ensure that the Law of War is upheld in order to
reduce the consequent result of widespread human suffering.
The Existing Framework of International Humanitarian Law
Most articulately stated, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), also known as the
Law of Armed Conflict or the Law of War, “is the body of rules that, in wartime, protects
persons who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities;” and seeks to limit
the methods and means of warfare while preventing human suffering in times of armed
conflict.2 The principle instruments of IHL are the four universally ratified Geneva
Conventions of 1949 as well as the three Additional Protocols of 1977 and 2005, as they
stipulate that civilians and wounded or captured combatants must be treated in a humane
manner.3 While the term jus ad bellum refers to the set of lawful criteria considered
before engagement in war, jus in bello (IHL) is the law that governs the way in which
warfare is conducted, irrespective of whether or not the cause of war is just. It works to
humanize war, and protect civilians by creating distinctions between who and what may
be targeted in conflicts, how this targeting is executed, weapons allowed, and the rights
and obligations of combatant forces.4 In the laws of war, principles of distinction,
proportionality, and necessary precaution for minimal effects on civilians are essential to
the way in which armed forces may participate in combat.5 Accordingly, IHL focuses on
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International Committee of the Red Cross, “Discover the ICRC,” ICRC, 2005,
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0790.pdf, 15.
3
Ibid.
4
Schmitt, Michael, "21st Century Conflict: Can the Law Survive?" Melbourne Journal of
International Law 8 no. 2 (2007): 444.
5
Presentation given to students of SIT: Geneva, at ICRC, on Tuesday 26 February 2013,
in Geneva.
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governing how military operations may take place, instead of the legality for the reason
of why they take place. In addition to formally adopted legislation of IHL, the rules of
customary international humanitarian law are norms based on human rights that are
considered to be binding even for states who have not officially ratified the Additional
Protocols.6 Furthermore, IHL distinguishes between two types of armed conflict—
international armed conflicts (IACs) fought between at least two States, and noninternational armed conflicts (NIACs) that do not involve two States as opposing parties
to the fighting—in order to extend its jurisdiction to as many instances as possible, so it
may reduce humanitarian violations at all levels of armed conflict.7
Changing Perceptions
Yet, in light of the changing conditions characterizing armed conflict in the 21st
century, there exist many challenges to the proper application of IHL in the world today.
Arguably, the perception of its irrelevance in contemporary conflicts for both State and
non-State actors is the most significant obstacle to preserving its original objectives, and
the subsequent lack of compliance—in any form—is undeniably detrimental to its
overriding purpose. It is argued that recent developments in warfare, which change the
nature of violent conflict, have led many to perceive IHL as non-applicable in the modern
era. Issues concerning challenges to humanitarian intervention, while essential for
providing relief to victims of war and natural disaster, are outside the scope of this paper.
Instead, non-compliance by parties to the actual armed conflict due to perceived
irrelevance, and subsequent practices of negative reciprocity are the most significant
6

Mack, Michelle, "Increasing Respect for International Humanitarian Law in NonInternational Armed Conflicts," ICRC, Geneva, 2008, 9.
7
Instances of violence that do not cross the threshold of the definition of “armed
conflict” are therefore not subject to IHL, but rather Human Rights and domestic law.
7

challenges for International Humanitarian Law and the jus in bello doctrine in
contemporary warfare—representing a vicious cycle that is most detrimental to its
underlying purpose of reducing human suffering. Finally, because of the lack of
consensus in the international system regarding if, and/or how IHL should be revised to
better reflect 21st century conflict, this challenge can only be overcome by 1) an increased
awareness of the beneficial incentives for abiding by existing IHL on the part of nonState actors 2) the realization of the benefits of positive reciprocity by both States and
non-State actors, and 3) increased willingness of States to engage in nonexclusive
dialogue oh behalf of all parties involved. First, an explanation of why it is progressively
difficult for IHL to effectively govern contemporary conflicts will be addressed.
II.

The Evolving Nature of Warfare

Emerging Patterns
It is not controversial to assert that warfare in the 21st century is markedly
distinctive from that of the early 20th century. Following World War II, evident changes
in the nature of war itself, transformations in both civilian and military technologies, and
attitudes toward military occupation have converged to call into question the adequacy of
existing international norms during an era marked by the rapid proliferation of violent
internal armed conflicts.8 These localized conflicts, driven by transnational connections
are a product of fourth generation warfare,9 and are propelled by the loss of the nation-
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Wippman, David. “Introduction: Do New Wars Call for New Laws?” In New Wars, New
Laws?, edited by David Wippman and Mathew Evangelista, Ardsley, New York:
Transnational Publishers, 2005, 1.
9
Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, "Transnationality, War and the
Law," A Report on a Roundtable on the Transformation of Warfare, International Law,
and the Role of Transnational Armed Groups. Cambridge: Harvard University, 2006, 7.
8

state’s monopoly on violence as well as the existence of “ad hoc warriors” in moral
conflict.10 A transformation of the traditional concept of war indicates that conflict is no
longer predominately characterized by a classical, state-centered paradigm in which
battle is fought between soldiers as agents of the State,11 but rather by the ‘intermixing of
other means’12 leading to complex and ambiguous situations of violence with less clearcut distinctions.
In a Report for the 31st Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, the ICRC
outlines various evolving characteristics of warfare that illustrate these recent
developments—all of which, have contributed to the fact that civilians continue to remain
the primary victims of violations of IHL in armed conflicts.13 First, there are more
frequently cases of low-intensity conflict in which a weakened state has “left room for
local militias and armed groups to operate, leading to environments where looting and
trafficking, extortion and kidnapping have become profitable economic strategies
sustained by violence and national, regional and international interests.”14 Second,
instances of extraterritorial military interventions and new forms of foreign military
presence in the territory of a state have caused a refocused attentiveness to the law of
occupation as it relates to IHL.15 Obvious illustrations include the occupation of
Afghanistan and Iraq in the first decade of the 21st century, as well as ongoing
10

“4GW—Fourth Generation Warfare,” May 2004,
http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/05/4gw_fourth_gene.html
11
Program on Humanitarian Policy, “Transnationality, War and Law,” 5
12 Ibid., 4
13
Violations such as murder, forced disappearance, torture, cruel treatment, outrages
upon personal dignity, acts of sexual violence, abuses of protective emblems, and
insecurity in the field all contribute to continued suffering, ICRC.
14
International Committee of the Red Cross, "International Humanitarian Law and the
challenges of contemporary armed conflicts," ICRC, 31IC/11/5.1.2, Geneva, 2011, 6
15
ICRC, “"International Humanitarian Law and Challenges,” 26.
9

occupations such as the Gaza Strip by Israel. Third, the impact of emerging
technologies—specifically advances in cyber capabilities, and thus, the threat of cyber
attack as a means for warfare—has proven to be an imminent threat and will undoubtedly
have major implications for the future of applicable humanitarian laws. Whether they be
denial-of-service attacks on an entire population, as evidenced by the 2008 cyber attacks
on Georgia, or unmanned aerial vehicles, such as the “drones” used by the United States
military, humanitarian laws created in the 1900s do not entirely reflect the reality of
technology in the 21st century. Another notable trend is the blurring of the lines of
distinction between ideological and non-ideological confrontations, with non-state armed
groups arising from organized criminal activity.16 Instances of civil unrest rising to the
level of armed conflict is demonstrated by situations in North Africa and the Middle East,
such as in Libya where opposing government forces have organized to form opposition
movements.17 Furthermore, the existence of transnational networks18 and multinational
conflict is enabled by the evolution of globalization in the 21st century; and a heightened
focus on the importance of information intelligence in a world that revolves around
complex communication and information systems such as the Internet, is undeniably key
to the development of modern warfare. Thus, in recent years, advances in technology,
globalization, and the proliferation of internal conflicts are all contributors to an
increasingly complex international system in which IHL created during the post-WWII
era, was not originally intended to operate. But while it is important to recognize these
occurrences affecting modes of modern war, it is equally as essential to refrain from

16

Ibid., 6
Ibid.
18
Such as terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda
17
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drawing overgeneralizations about these “new wars” when it comes to the application and
implementation of International Humanitarian Law.19
The Predominance of Non-International Conflicts
Today, most armed conflicts are qualified as being of a non-international
character for the purpose of classification under IHL,20 and in 2009, the Stockholm
International Peace Reseach Institute determined that 17 ‘major’ armed conflicts were all
intra-state in nature.21 Additionally, particularly in the last decade there has been an
emergence of “multinational NIACs” in which two or more national forces may be
fighting together against one or more organized group within the territory of the host
state.22 France intervention in Mali starting in January 2013 is perhaps the most recent
example of a multinational but non-international conflict, confirming this recently
recurring pattern.
According to existing IHL, in the event of a non-international conflict, Article 3
common to the four Conventions called a “treaty in miniature” by the ICRC, and Protocol
II should be applied. Article 3 requires that each party to the conflict shall apply
minimum humanitarian provisions prohibiting violence against, taking hostages of, and
executions of, any person taking no active part in the hostilities.23 In addition it calls for
the care of the wounded and sick without any distinction founded on race, color, religion
19

The idea that “New Wars” require “New Laws” is rejected in this paper, rather the idea
is presented that “New Wars” pose challenges to IHL, which must be overcome by
suppressing the notion that it is now obsolete.
20
Bellal, Annyssa, and Stuart Casey-Malsen. "Enhancing Compliance with International
Law by Armed Non-State Actors ." Goettingen Journal of International Law 3 (2011), 2.
21
L. Harbon & P. Wallensteen, ‘Appendix 2A. Patterns of major armed conflicts, 2000–
2009’, SIPRI Yearbook 2010, SIPRI, Stockholm, www.sipri.org/yearbook/2010/02/02A
22
ICRC, “"International Humanitarian Law and Challenges,” 10.
23
International Committee of the Red Cross, “International Humanitarian Law: Answers
to Your Questions,” Geneva, 2004, Www.icrc.org. ICRC, Oct. 2002, 19.
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or faith, sex, wealth, or similar criteria; and the allowance of an impartial humanitarian
body, such as the ICRC, to offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.24
Yet whilst these mandates provide clear obligations and protections for the Parties
in theory, the reality of conflict is much less straightforward, and it must be understood
that non-international armed conflicts are generally less easily discernable than
international armed conflicts. Though Additional Protocol II aims to strengthen the
protection of victims in these instances,25 “the treaty rules applicable in non-international
armed conflicts are, in fact, rudimentary compared to those applicable in international
armed conflicts. Not only are there fewer of these treaty rules, but thy are also less
detailed and, in the case of Additional Protocol II, their application is dependent on the
specific situation.”26 Furthermore, as one of the stipulations required for a conflict to be
considered a NIAC under Article 3 is the fact that the violence must “reach a certain level
of intensity,”27 IHL does not apply in instances of internal violence that amount to
situations of “internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts
of violence and other acts of a similar nature.”28 Therefore, the applicability of IHL as it
relates to internal conflict is the core of many ongoing debates about the overall
effectiveness of its authority today. An instance where the applicability of IHL was called
into question is manifested in the case of Mali. Originally, the level of intensity of the

24

International Committee of the Red Cross, “Answers to your Questions,” 19.
International Committee of the Red Cross, “Discover the ICRC,” 16.
26
Mack, Michelle, "Increasing Respect,” 9, 10.
27
“Intensity” indicative factors as assessed by international jurisprudence include the
number, duration, and intensity of individual confrontations, the type of weapons used,
the number of persons involved and munitions fired, types of forces partaking in the
fighting, the number of casualties, extent of destruction, and number of civilians fleeing
combat zones, ICRC, “International Humanitarian Law and Challenges,” 8-9.
28
Additional Protocol II, Article I, paragraph 2.
25
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conflict was unclear, and the international community was faced with the decision of
applying either IHL (if in fact it qualified as an armed conflict) or Human Rights Law (if
it was to be considered merely internal violence).29 This legal dilemma illustrates the
increasing difficulty in classifying armed violence for the purposes of IHL, and it is
argued by some scholars that the very term “armed conflict” is insufficient for the
purpose of regulating much of the internal violence today.30
Taking into account developing complexities in war, combined with the fact that
humanitarian norms are less stringently and explicitly applicable to the most common
type of conflict experienced today (NIACs), the obvious reaction is that IHL is rendering
less and less relevant in instances of contemporary violence. This perspective, however,
is inaccurate, and is in and of itself one of the major problems contributing to violations
of humanitarian norms, and consequently to the successful application of IHL.
The Prevalence of Non-State Actors
While the very nature of 21st century warfare has arguably undergone significant
developments in recent years, it is widely noted that non-State actors actively play an
increasingly substantial role in contemporary violent conflicts.31 Although it is important
to recognize the fact that armed non-State actors have been fighting against States
throughout history, in previous eras, they more easily fit within the parameters of

29

Interview conducted with Marina Mattirolo, Researcher at the Geneva Academy of
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, on Wednesday 8 May 2013 in
Geneva.
30
Sassoli, Marco, "The Implementation of International Humanitarian Law: Current and
Inherent Challenges," Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 10 (December 2007),
64.
31
Veuthey, Michel. “Implementing International Humanitarian Law: Old and New
Ways” in: RAMCHARAN, Bertrand G. (Ed.) Human Rights Protection in the Field.
Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 2006, 23.
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domestic law enforcement.32 As the nature of war evolves due to the phenomenon of
globalization, so too does the nature of pertinent actors exerting influence, and
subsequently their role as agents to armed conflict around the world.
The spectrum of new types of non-state actors is broad, “encompassing a range of
identities, motivations and varying degrees of willingness and ability, to observe IHL and
other international law standards.”33 Various sorts of non-State actors include groups
classified as: organized armed groups, transnational corporations, private military and
security companies, paramilitary forces, urban gangs, militias and the huge variety of
transnational criminal entities—including so-called “terrorist” groups and pirates.34 In
defining non-State actors it is also important to differentiate between armed non-State
groups that use force as a means for furthering a political objective,35 and non-violent
non-State actors that could simply be NGOs, international organizations, or corporations.
While there are many definitions for differing terms such as: violent non-State actor,
armed non-State actor (ANSA), non-State actor (NSA), armed non-State group, etc., for
the purpose of this paper, and for the sake of simplicity, these terms will be used
interchangeably.36

32

Program on Humanitarian Policy, “Transnationality, War and Law,” 7.
C Australian Red Cross, "The Changing Face of Warfare in the 21st Century,"
International Humanitarian Law Magazine. 2012,
http://www.redcross.org.au/files/IHL_Magazine_Issue_1_2012.pdf, 4.
34
Ibid., 4
35
DCAF, Geneva Call, "Armed Non-State Actors: Current Trends & Future Challenges,"
The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. 2011,
http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Armed-Non-State-Actors-Current-Trends-FutureChallenges, 7.
36
These terms all refer to a violent group not belonging to State military forces that take
up arms against an opposing force or population in order to further a military, political,
religious, or ideological objective
33
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In addition, the characteristics of violent non-State groups are wide-ranging. Their
members may include men, women and children who are recruited either forcefully or
voluntarily, they may or may not effectively exert control over a physical territory,
operate internationally or nationally, have ranging degrees of political motivation, use
varying tactics such as guerrilla warfare in rural areas or urban violence against civilian
populations, and rely on varying levels of resources.37 In spite of their diversity, violent
non-State actors generally operate in the “illegitimate” sphere for purposes of domestic
law,38 and are largely considered illegal and clandestine. Regardless of their
characteristics, they are capable of endangering the lives of communities by “hindering
humanitarian aid, planting landmines, recruiting and using child soldiers, and by
trafficking and misusing small arms and light weapons”39 Additionally, their existence
and contribution to non-international armed conflict often goes unacknowledged by the
States under whose territory they operate.
In a Report conducted by Harvard University, it was determined that new
transnational non-State groups are characterized primarily by their statelessness,
emancipation, privatization, and asymmetric position towards states, and ultimately “are
problematic because they are irregular, difficult to respond to, and generally
unrecognized by the long-standing laws of war.”40 The difficulties these emerging types
of actors present to the application and compliance of IHL is wide-ranging. Under Article
3, the second condition for the regulation of a NIAC is the existence of “Parties,” which

37

DCAF, Geneva Call, "Armed Non-State Actors,” 5-10.
Ibid., 9
39
Ibid.,12
40
Program on Humanitarian Policy, “Transnationality, War and Law,” 10.
38
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“must demonstrate a certain level of organization.”41 Accordingly, regardless of the level
of violence, for any non-international conflict to function as such under IHL, both parties
(whether a state fighting a non-state actor, or two non-state actors fighting each other)
must meet these criteria. Yet, groups that fall outside this classification like gangs,
paramilitary forces, crime groups and vigilantes still pose a challenge to the respect for
humanitarian norms in violent conflict. An instance where the “organization” threshold
was called into question was in the case of Syria, illustrating that along with the
“intensity” factor of the conflict, the level of a group’s organization also contributes to
ambiguity for the legal definition of armed conflict under IHL.42
While there is no question that International Humanitarian Law does in fact
regulate the actions of non-State actors in armed conflicts, the fact that non-State actors
are more influential than ever only serves to illustrate the necessity for the better
application, implementation and compliance with IHL in contemporary times. It is
precisely for this reason that in a period largely characterized by ongoing noninternational armed conflicts wherein non-State groups make up at least half of all
belligerents,43 the importance of IHL as it applies to these situations must be actively
clarified and more accurately applied and enforced in order to uphold its original
objective. Thus, as shaped by these evolving patterns in warfare, predominance of noninternational armed conflict, and increasing emergence of non-State actors—in the
41

“Organization” indicators developed by the international jurisprudence may include the
existence of a command structure, disciplinary rules and mechanisms within the armed
group, the ability to obtain, transport or distribute arms, ability to plan, coordinate and
carry out military operations, the existence of headquarters, the ability to negotiate and
conclude agreement such as peace accords, etc. ICRC, "International Humanitarian Law
and Challenges,” 8.
42 Interview, Marina Mattirolo.
43
Bellal, Annyssa, and Stuart Casey-Malsen, "Enhancing Compliance,” 4.
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contemporary legal, political, and concrete reality of International Humanitarian Law,
there exists a multitude of specific conditions that cause both non-State actors as well as
States to disregard their obligation of compliance during periods of armed conflict.
III.

Challenges to IHL in the Context of Contemporary Conflicts
While there are far too many issues to specifically address for the purpose of this

paper, one useful outline for understanding the challenges that face non-State actors in
complying with IHL is drafted by the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian
Law and Human Rights. It categorizes the factors into five main groups, including: 1)
strategic military concerns, 2) likelihood of prosecution under domestic law, 3) lack of
knowledge of international norms, 4) ideology as a cause for deliberate violation, 5) a
lack of “ownership” over international norms.44 While external incentives, both negative
and positive such as ideology certainly affect compliance with IHL, in the following
sections the main focus will be on reasons that involve both State and non-State groups in
the interplay of norms and reactions leading to humanitarian violations.
Non-State Actors: Bound Without Consent or Opportunity for Participation
It is perhaps readily apparent that one of the most prominent challenges to the
effectiveness of International Humanitarian Law is the issue of non-compliance by the
multitude of non-state actors formerly mentioned. But analogous to this problem is the
fact that non-State actors are not autonomously or voluntarily Party to the treaties and
conventions under which they are legally bound. Instead, IHL as ratified by States around
the world includes the definitions of, and stipulations for NSAs in times of armed conflict
44

Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Rules of
Engagement: Protecting Civilians Through Dialogue with Armed Non-State Actors,
October 2011, http://www.genevaacademy.ch/docs/publications/Policy%20studies/Rules-of-Engagement-EN.pdf 5-6.
17

simply because they are de facto parties to the conflict. The theory referred to as the
‘principle of legislative jurisdiction’ is a majority view of the international community,
holding that non-state actors are bound under IHL by reason of their being active on the
territory of a Contracting Party (a State Party to the Geneva Conventions and/or its
Additional Protocols).45 But without their participation in the creation of these laws, and
even oftentimes without their knowledge of them, it is difficult to expect comprehensive
compliance, and ironically, “there are no groups that feel less represented by the State
than armed opposition groups.”46 Aside from a contradiction regarding the treatment of
NSAs in domestic law versus IHL, the mere fact that non-State actors are not privy to the
international laws governing them does little to ensure that they will abide by their
standards. Thus, arguably at the heart of this issue is the denial of consent and
participation in rule making. In addition, the argument of IHL’s inherent “legitimacy” has
little substance from the perspective of non-State actors, and “willingness to comply on
the part of an actor is crucially dependent on the perception of its having consented to, or
at least having participated in the formation of the law one is bound by.”47 As such, in a
period when violent non-State actors increasingly exert influence in modern warfare, the
reality that only States are party to the treaties of IHL is a negative factor hindering
effective compliance.
Asymmetric Warfare
As illustrated, in recent years a number of overarching patterns have been

45

Ryngaert, Cedric, “Non-State Actors and International Humanitarian Law,” Katholieke
Universiteit Leuven Faculty of Law, Nstituut Voor Internationaal Recht, K.U. Leuven,
2008, 5
46
Ryngaert, Cedric. “Non-State Actors and International Humanitarian Law,” 5.
47
Ibid., 8
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observed. Namely, findings show an increase in the diversity of situations of armed
conflict, ranging from conditions utilizing the most advanced technology and weapons
systems by sophisticated government militaries (for example, the US) in asymmetric
warfare, to instances characterized by low technology and a high degree of fragmentation
of parties to the conflict.48
In considering the major progressions of warfare, it is concluded that paramount
to the challenge they pose is their contribution to the notion of asymmetry in warfare—a
reality central to the difficulty of compliance for both State and non-State actors. While it
is recognized that the obvious preference in warfare is to be on the stronger side of an
asymmetric conflict in order to prevail, modern technology has given wealthy State
militaries an extraordinary advantage in combat—a reality that largely undermines
compliance with IHL.49 It is noted that the more asymmetric a conflict is, the more
difficulties arise for implementation of IHL and for humanitarian action, as both sides are
convinced that they must violate or at least ‘reinterpret’ IHL to suit their needs.50 In a
case where a major, technologically capable, and organized militaristic state power is
fighting a loosely organized militant rebel group, most rules are in practice largely
addressed to only one side51 (The militaristically advantaged side most likely to win).52
Politically driven conflicts may incite violence against groups other than the military
enemy, and the weaker side in an asymmetric conflict often lacks the “necessary
structures of authority, hierarchy, communication between superiors and subordinates
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ICRC, "International Humanitarian Law and Challenges,” 5.
Schmitt, Michael, "21st Century Conflict,” 460-65
50
Sassòli, Marco, “Current and Inherent Challenges,” 58.
51
Sassòli, Marco, “Current and Inherent Challenges,” 58.
52
Schmitt, Michael, "21st Century Conflict,” 462
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and process of accountability, all of which are necessary […] to enforce IHL or any other
rules.”53 Violations of IHL are often perceived as necessary for less sophisticated nonState armed groups because they have neither the incentive, nor the capability to “fairly”
defeat the stronger enemy State (as evidenced in combat in the Middle East); conversely
they are perceived as necessary for the State as the only means by which sensitive
information about terrorist activities can by obtained (as evidenced by the War on
Terror).54 Both of these situations of asymmetry will be examined in the following
section, illustrating that the perceived necessity for violating IHL in asymmetrical battle
is a major challenge to the respect of humanitarian norms in violent conflict, leading to
issues of negative reciprocity, and subsequent issues of non-compliance.
Combat in the Middle East
The Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan provide clear illustrations of the manifestation
of humanitarian violations by both State and non-State actors as a direct result of
asymmetric warfare. For the technologically disadvantaged side of insurgents in Iraq,
violations of IHL offered ways to 1) ensure survival55 and 2) get close enough to enemy
US soldiers to kill them.56
Consider the practice of immersion into civilian populations. The act of taking
advantage of protected property by positioning military equipment and troops in or near
civilian buildings inherently caused difficulty in the principle of distinction for Coalition
forces while also providing illegitimate shields in combat. In a direct violation of
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Additional Protocol I,57 Iraqi forces misused specially protected objects such as alNasiriyya Surgical Hospital, the Baghdad Red Crescent Maternity Hospital, and the
Imam Ali and Abu Hanifa mosques for military purposes.58 In addition, the tactic of
perfidious attack (ruses) including dressing as civilians in order to cause the enemy to
lower its guard, and feigning surrender were all blatant violations practiced by Iraqi
forces.59 Because non-State armed groups are most oftentimes operating within populated
areas, and though this is in-and-of itself a direct violation of IHL, military justification for
bypassing the legal precautions necessary to minimized risk to civilians is even
amplified.60 The tactic of dressing as a civilian in order to conduct suicide bombings is a
growing phenomenon seen not only in Iraq, but also in asymmetric conflicts in
Afghanistan and Israel as well.61 Furthermore, Iraqi forces resorted to tactics intended to
undercut the morale of the civilian population by attacking individuals directly in
situations where engaging in combat against the advanced Coalition forces had little
effect.62
In these cases, the first principle of IHL (distinction) was blatantly violated
because of the perceived need to disregard humanitarian norms. According to Marina
Maittirolo, a researcher at the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and
Human Rights, the occurrence of battle in areas largely populated by civilians is an
increasingly frequent phenomenon of modern warfare, and only makes it harder for the
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proper application of IHL to be implemented in combat;63 ultimately leading to the death
of thousands of innocent civilians every year.
State Power and the Global “War on Terror”
It must be conceded that the issue of non-compliance with International
Humanitarian Law is not only applicable to the perspectives and actions of non-State
actors, and in many cases, it is indeed the State itself that disregards principles of IHL in
times of armed conflict. From a historical perspective, the monopolization of violence by
the state and its perceived role of right authority to wage war have undoubtedly played a
fundamental role in the development and application of IHL,64 and the fact that only
States have the power to participate in conventions and ratify international legislation
gives national governments a sense of overriding authority in non-international armed
conflicts. In many cases the State is even unwilling to actually acknowledge the existence
of an armed group, fearing that in doing so, a level of legitimacy will be given to its
cause.65 Furthermore no consensus as to the content of jus in bello currently exists, and it
should be noted that many states are not ratifying parties to the Additional Protocols in
IHL,66 which does little to ensure humanitarian norms are formally respected.
Arguably one of the most controversial and ambiguous challenges to International
Humanitarian Law in the 21st century is the development of the so-called War on Terror
declared by the United States government following the attacks on September 11, 2001.
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Though the UN has generally agreed that any measure taken to combat terrorism must do
so in accordance with international law, including the rules of IHL,67 in practice this is
not always the case, and national governments, namely the US, frequently partake in
activities strictly forbidden under IHL in the name of the allusive War on Terror. A
desire to bypass compliance with the Geneva Conventions in this “new kind of war”
which “places a high premium on other factors, such as the ability to quickly obtain
information from captured terrorists and their sponsors in order to avoid further
atrocities,” is illustrated in a memo to former President Bush stating that the “new
paradigm renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations on questioning of enemy
prisoners…”68 Exceptions to protection for non-State actors are advocated and applied by
military personnel, and include “the desirability of torture and other inhumane or
degrading treatment in order to extract crucial intelligence (e.g., waterboarding), the
transfer of detained fighters outside the territory where they were captured [for example,
to Guantanamo], and the use of military commissions to put captured ‘enemy
combatants’ on trial.”69
In addition, contrary to the U.S. view, from a legal standpoint the War on Terror
is often not actually regarded as an internationally legitimate conflict,70 and though the
practice of denying the existence of an internal armed conflict is traditionally the
mechanism by which states avoid responsibility under IHL, the US actually does the
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opposite. Despite the fact that acts of terrorism are in fact subject to domestic law, the
War on Terror has effectively caused states such as the US to “over classify” situations
of violence, in order to apply IHL even where it does not apply—allowing for actions
such as the targeted killings of “terrorists” as legitimate enemy combatants.71 Previous
proponents of applying IHL in the broadest sense possible are now faced with the
challenges this ‘overapplication’ presents in the contest of “New Wars,” as it deprives
persons of the better protection they would benefit from under the law of peace, it is
applied selectively, and overall it weakens “the willingness to respect IHL entirely,
unconditionally and independently of conflicting contrary interests even in situations
where IHL actually and uncontroversially applies.”72
Holder vs. Humanitarian Law Project
Aside from direct activities which violate IHL, the problem is not aided by the
fact that “Certain governments have also been reluctant to acknowledge the need for the
ICRC and other components of the Movement to engage non-state armed groups on
issues relating to their security and access to victims, as well as to disseminate IHL and
humanitarian principles, on the grounds that the armed groups in question are ‘terrorist
organisations’ or are otherwise outlaws.”73 The U.S. Supreme Court ruling of 2010 in the
case of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project upheld the USA PATRIOT Act, which bans
any “assistance” to terrorist organizations, effectively ensuring legal grounds for the
prosecution of anyone engaging in the promotion of humanitarian norms with groups or
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individuals listed as terrorists.74 Not only does this prevent organizations from “legally”
engaging in productive dialogue with armed non-State actors, but by listing a group as
terrorists, their inclusion in activities such as peace negotiations, and the opportunity for
furthering their understanding of, and compliance with IHL is completely diminished—
perhaps even prolonging violent conflict responsible for the death of innocent lives.75 The
very act of labeling groups as “terrorists” is not conductive to furthering respect for
humanitarian norms, and in the words of a former fighter, “once you are labeled a
terrorist you act as one; once listed, ‘you are rejected’ and ‘you have nothing to lose.’”76
Thus, in reality the self-serving attitude adopted by states, and method of “picking
and choosing” when and how the rules of IHL can apply, should be regarded as one of
the gravest threats to humanitarian norms that the world is currently facing, if for no other
reason than the fact that it is practiced by the very States who drafted the rules of IHL in
the first place.
The Reciprocity Obstacle
The principle of reciprocity has historically functioned as a longstanding
cornerstone to the law of war, even before IHL came into its current form of existence,
and “Reciprocity continues to form a critical component of the law of war and structures
both theoretical and pragmatic discourse.”77 But in the context of modern warfare,
negative reciprocity, and the justification of humanitarian violations by citing an
opposing force’s violations is commonly expressed. “There is an obvious temptation—
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and often also pressure from within the armed group or the concerned communities—to
respond to abuses by government forces or other non-state armed actors. Responding
with abuses of their own will merely risk an increasing spiral of violence.”78
Mistreatment and/or execution or captured combatants is likely to result in abuses by the
opposing force; and while causing belligerents to subsequently fight until death, is
actually counterproductive in warfare. Although reciprocity is not a legal justification for
humanitarian violations, the idea of positive reciprocity is undoubtedly a non-legal
incentive for better respect of humanitarian norms,79 and should be encouraged wherever
and whenever possible. The true challenge is making the transition from negative to
positive reciprocity in armed conflicts, especially in an era where the realities of combat
do little to reprimand the practice of the former.
IV.

Implications for Compliance with IHL

Necessity for Working in the Context of the Existing Framework
In light of these challenging developments, as previously expressed, some have
emphasized the decreasing relevance of IHL as “treaty law may fall into desuetude when
a change in the nature of conflict renders it ill-fitting in contemporary warfare.”80 In
reality however, war has never been a clear-cut matter, and throughout history there have
always been instances of combat that fall outside the scope of man-to-man battle in the
field.81 While new technologies and unique developing patterns do have an effect on the
way in which war is generally fought, obstacles to Just War have always been present.
Thus, the relevance of IHL in the 21st century is entirely dependent upon its perceived
78
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relevance by actors involved, and subsequently their willingness to comply with its
stipulations. Though these changes in the nature of conflict remain problematic to the
determination and application of appropriate bodies of international law, they are not the
sole reason for violations of IHL by both State and non-State actors party to conflict. An
inherent issue of IHL is the fact that it seeks to operate in “an international society of
states not willing to uphold the rule of international law,” which inhibits the very
mechanisms already in place for successful implementation.82 As such, the lack of
political will illustrated by national governments to abide by existing law is considerably
the most detrimental factor inhibiting the goal of gaining compliance by non-State
actors.83
Certainly, the question of how to better ensure compliance with existing
humanitarian norms by NSAs in the face of new conflicts is one argued by many
scholars. Among a vast array of varied opinions, there is a major division between two
approaches pitted against one another: the development of new law versus the ideal of
self-preservation.84 Though there is a strong case for revising the existing legal
framework in a way that could extend further protection to NSAs in combat from the
stigma of domestic law, subsequently providing more concrete incentives for violent
groups to obey international law,85 it is argued here that the international system is far too
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slow and ineffective to reach a consensus anytime in the near future.86 Continuously
ongoing debates in the international sphere concerning the legal definition and
regulations of “terrorism” and “counterterrorist” approaches on a global level are an
example of the lack of consensus, and unlikelihood of such a mandate to transpire.87 Even
supplementary treaties applicable to non-international conflict, such as the Ottawa
Convention banning anti-personnel landmines, are still only addressed to States, and are
limited in their ability to enforce accountability.88
While International Humanitarian Law does not perfectly reflect the realities of
warfare in contemporary conflict, it is important to realize that long-standing
humanitarian norms are not so archaic that they cannot be applied in practice. The duty of
lawyers in any field is to interpret existing laws and employ them as best as possible to a
present situation, and the same truism applies to non-international conflicts and IHL in
the world today.89 Therefore, it is necessary to consider the ways in which IHL can and
should be implemented given the current circumstances and available mechanisms for
securing enhanced compliance.
Taking Steps Towards Promoting Non-State Compliance
Regardless of if, when, or how IHL should be revised, some key findings over the
years have been identified as good practices to furthering compliance with existing IHL.
Contrary to decisions made by governments such as the U.S., it is argued here that central
86

For example, the structure of the United Nations relies on a consensus-based system
that is not conducive toward rapid developments in IHL. Additionally, ad hoc committees
only arise for specific issues, and there is no dominant mechanism, by which IHL could
be rapidly reformed—perhaps for good reason. Additionally, not even all States are party
to the Additional Protocols, so what would force them to adopt any new IHL now?
87
Interview, Marco Sassòli.
88
Sassòli, Marco, “Current and Inherent Challenges,” 63.
89
Interview, Marco Sassòli.
28

to assuring compliance with humanitarian norms by violent non-State actors is
comprehensive, active engagement—irrespective of any criteria which might preclude a
group from lawful interaction with State actors. Activities aiming to incorporate nonState actors in the decision making process, which ultimately give them a sense of
ownership and accountability for the humanitarian rules under which they must function
during armed conflict, are crucial to the successful implementation of IHL. According to
the Geneva Academy for International Humanitarian Law, “A variety of mechanisms
exist for ANSAs [Armed non-State Actors] to commit to respecting international norms,
such as unilateral declarations, special agreements, Memoranda of Understanding,
‘Ground Rules’, Action Plans, or deeds of commitment;”90 and these methods must be
unequivocally pursued by outside actors capable of helping non-State groups attain
compliance. There are many organizations that regularly engage with armed non-State
groups, including, but not limited to: The ICRC, Geneva Call, Human Rights Watch,
Amnesty International, and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue; and the activities of
each should be regarded as indispensible toward furthering compliance with IHL.
First, it must be acknowledged that the very task of disseminating the rules of IHL
to armed non-State actors is a challenging prerequisite for its understanding and ultimate
application. Indeed, “an important step in enhancing compliance with international norms
is to ensure that the relevant ANSA is aware of its obligations under international law. In
come cases, for example, such groups have not been aware of the prohibition on child
recruitment and the potential individual liability.”91 In considering a solution to this issue,
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Marco Sassòli advocates for the negotiation of a simple, two page “code of conduct”
specifically tailored for armed groups, helping to simplify the over 500 articles of The
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols—which are arguably far too complex for
the purpose of furthering understanding and observance in urgent times of armed
conflict.92 By giving armed groups a simple outline of the rules of IHL, the potential for
acceptance and perceived advantages for complying are enhanced. The adoption of a
code of conduct by an armed non-State group is evidence of its intention to “ensure
military discipline while respecting local culture and the civilian population, while
remaining in compliance with international norms,”93 ensuring that the group assumes
responsibility for adoption, dissemination, and implementation of applicable norms.
In addition, non-state armed groups could be provided with advisory services by
impartial organizations such as the ICRC in order to more fully develop comprehension
of responsibility and accountability in warfare. While such a service currently exists for
States, it should also be available for non-State armed groups as a tool for reducing
violations.94 Moreover, providing information to military commanders rather than
political representatives is indispensable to furthering compliance with humanitarian
norms, as there is often disconnect between political and diplomatic relations and the
realities of combat.95 Other methods include disseminating information to populations
that are difficult to access through public broadcasts or television exposés, educating
individuals on their rights and responsibilities under the law.96
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A second step for furthering compliance with humanitarian norms is by engaging
non-state actors in informal discussions and conventions. Correspondingly, it is essential
that humanitarian groups that engage in dialogue with non-State groups are open to truly
hearing and considering their concerns and grievances.97 It is unproductive to just simply
hand over a pamphlet and expect a violent armed group to automatically adhere to the
contents—mediation and genuine discourse are essential.98 Geneva Call is an impartial
and neutral NGO that is “dedicated to engaging armed non-State actors towards
compliance with the norms of IHL” by focusing on NSAs that operate outside effective
State control through employing contracts called “Deeds of Commitment.”99 These
treaty-like instruments, by which the armed non-State actor formally pledges to respect
humanitarian norms is meant to mirror the texts of international treaties which these
NSAs cannot legally sign.100 Areas in which Geneva Call specifically works to further the
observance of IHL norms concern landmines, children, and gender issues. One of the
main advantages of Geneva Call is that it is solely a humanitarian dialogue organization,
and does not serve the purpose of providing humanitarian aid. This is a benefit because
representatives of an organization like ICRC are often faced with the decision of giving
in to norms of non-compliance by a non-State actor, in order to provide aid to a
population in need.101
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Lastly, monitoring compliance with humanitarian norms is vital. Yet, most
verification mechanisms addressing the conduct of armed non-State rarely appear in
multilateral treaties, and even when they do, are “weak and not applied in practice.”102
While most IHL and human rights treaties only address the conduct of states, neither
Additional Protocol II nor Common Article 3 have any provisions for regulating the
monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of non-State group behaviors. It is
therefore necessary that better mechanisms for these practices be developed. For
example, Geneva Call’s Deeds of Commitment utilize a three-pronged system including:
self-reporting, third-party monitoring, and field missions to proactively regulate
compliance with groups who have pledged not to use anti-personnel land mines. In
practice, 38 out of 41 signatories of the Deed of Commitment Banning AP Mines have
succeeded to abide by their self-reporting obligation. Creating a sense of ownership and
personal accountability is invaluable to the ultimate success of IHL, and the work of
engagement organizations such as Geneva Call is essential to furthering compliance with
non-State actors typically not given a voice in international discourse.
VI. Concluding Remarks
For as long as non-state armed groups are a reality of war, their existence and
influence must not be ignored; nor should the paradigm that some are in inherently ‘bad’
restrict productive dialogue aiming to advance the effectiveness of International
Humanitarian Law in armed conflicts. By refusing to engage these types of actors, there
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is little to no likelihood that non-international armed conflicts will in any way be reduced
in frequency or intensity; and in fact, both blind ignorance as well as lack of effect means
for non-state actors to comply with IHL will only further the suffering and despair of
innocent lives. It is a vicious cycle, and it is not one that will be easy to break without
more respect, regard, and responsible application of International Humanitarian Law by
the national governments that agreed to ratify the four Geneva Conventions in the first
place. In his 2010 report, the Secretary-General of the UN urged Member States to
“consider the potential humanitarian consequences of their legal and policy initiatives
and to avoid introducing measures that have the effect of inhibiting humanitarian actors
in their efforts to engage armed groups for humanitarian purposes.” Yet, as evidenced by
the actions of States like the US in the War on Terror, the policy of national governments
unwilling to engage with armed non-State actors is a challenge still to be overcome.
There is now, an overtly apparent and inherent necessity for IHL to become more
flexible in the context of contemporary conflicts, as they are only becoming more
complicated. It is undisputed that non-State groups will continue to exert influence, and
as former ICRC President Jakob Kellenberger has stated, "while lack of compliance of
non-State armed groups is a very serious problem that we need to address, reinforcement
of international law rules and mechanisms lies in the hands of States.”103 The lack of
political will by powerful government and military representatives is not an excuse for
the continued human suffering that still takes place as a result of indifference toward
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internationally binding laws and treaties; and it is absolutely imperative that the State and
its armed forces act in a way that exemplifies correct behavior in times of armed conflict,
in order to encourage behaviors of positive reciprocity, if there is any hope of achieving
compliance by violent non-state actors in the increasingly complex reality of
contemporary warfare.
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